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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the impact of malnutrition on the dis-
tribution of abilities and income in a simple overlapping generations
framework. Workers are distributed uniformly over a low-ability and a
high-ability range. If workers earn below subsistence wages, the prob-
ability that their children will have low abilities is higher than with
above subsistence wages due to the malnutrition resulting from low
incomes. Using a nested Ethier production function we find that there
is an optimal share of low-ability workers in the economy which max-
imizes output. Due to the intergenerational propagation of low abili-
ties resulting from malnutrition, economies may however get trapped
in sub-optimal equilibria with too large shares of low-ability workers.
Distributing food coupons financed by taxes of the parent generation
to the offspring of these low-ability workers will increase the likelihood
that they will be in the high-ability range, permanently increasing out-
put for future generations. Using a numerical example, we show that
this type of redistributive policy is welfare improving if the parent gen-
eration alive during the initiation of the policy is reimbursed for their
loss in utility due to taxes.
∗Maastricht University, MERIT. E-mail to: Adriaan.vanZon@MERIT.unimaas.nl
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1 INTRODUCTION 3
1 Introduction
Just weeks ago, the Copenhagen Consensus 2004 identified hunger and mal-
nutrition as one of the ten greatest challenges facing he world of today.
Specifically, Behrmann et al.1 discuss in their contribution in detail the
extent of the problem from an economic point of view, arguing that apart
from humanitarian reasons to alleviate the situation, potential productivity
gains of the labor force would outweigh the cost of reducing malnutrition.
The role of nutrition on labor productivity has been discussed before, e.g.
by Leibenstein (1957); Mirlees, (1975); Bliss and Stern (1978); and espe-
cially by Dasgupta and Ray (1986, 1987) and Dasgupta (1991, 1993, 1997).
In fact, Dasgupta (1993) suggests that malnutrition may lead to dynastic
poverty traps. A recent example (Galor and Mayer, 2002) explores the
further-reaching implications of malnutrition leading to lower ability to take
advantage of (public) education, leading to the persistence of inequality if
basic needs are not addressed. We want to discuss the impact of malnutrition
on a much more basic level, paying particular attention to the persistence
of inequality over generations brought about by low wages and malnutri-
tion. As e.g. extended upon in Harper et al. (2003), malnutrition can have
such detrimental effects that children born to undernourished women can
remain small, underweight and even impaired in their cognitive abilities for
life. Even with the current speed of improvement of nutritional standards,
about 1 billion children will be impaired in their mental development in
2020 due to the compound effect of malnutrition of parents and children.
Clearly, these children will have in turn a hard time to gain a wage that
is sufficient to cover all basic needs, leading again to malnutrition and the
same harmful consequences for their own children. In addition, even if chil-
dren have later in life access to education and health care, they will still be
affected by their previous actual and in utero malnutrition. Innate abilities
and general health will be lower than they had been with adequate nutrition,
such that schooling children and fighting diseases will be a lot less efficient
than under normal conditions. This makes it especially hard to escape the
intergenerational poverty trap described above.
The general idea of the paper is thus that an uneven distribution of
income gives rise to an equally uneven distribution of (productive) abili-
ties within a population, and hence to the underutilization of the ultimate
productive potential of the population at large. From that perspective the
redistribution of income may be a positive sum game. To illustrate the
general idea outlined above, we present a simple overlapping generations
model in which each member of a generation belongs to one of two different
groups in society: a group of individuals distributed over a range of rela-
1Their Challenge Paper also contains a very thorough discussion of the latest literature
in economics as well as nutritional science.
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tively high abilities, and a group distributed over a relatively low ability
range. Furthermore, each individual of the population goes through three
separate stages in life. The first stage refers to infancy: the individual is
inactive and depends on its parents for consumption. In the second stage,
the individual works; the income is spent on the children’s consumption as
well as on own, present and future, consumption. In the third phase the
individual, again inactive, will have to rely on the savings made during the
active period. We derive the optimum levels of consumption for the indi-
vidual’s children and for itself both when adult and when old. We are thus
able to derive the consumption of children relative to subsistence level con-
sumption. Since we assume that below subsistence level consumption will
increase the probability that these children will belong to the low-ability
group in society, it follows that parents with below subsistence level income
will have a relatively high probability of having low-ability offspring.
The production structure of the model can be characterized as a multi-
level Ethier function (cf. Romer, 1990) in which capital is combined with
a labor complex consisting of a high-skilled and a low-skilled labor sub-
complex. These sub-complexes in turn are aggregates over the skill ranges
associated with each labor-complex. We furthermore allow for asymmetries
in the contribution by skill to output and corresponding asymmetries in
marginal productivities by skill. For the same level of supply by ability it
follows that high-skilled workers will earn a higher wage than people with
low skills. Consequently, the probability that high-skilled people earn above
subsistence level wages is higher than for people with low skills, and so will
be the probability that their offspring will be in the high-ability range.
This setting may generate multiple equilibria with respect to the skill
distribution in the population, two of the three potential equilibria are sta-
ble. Only coincidentally will one of these two equilibrium points however
coincide with the utility maximizing distribution of the working population
over the two ability ranges. If the economy is in a high-inequality steady
state, redistributive policy will therefor be a welfare improvement. The rea-
son why this is the case is that a higher proportion of people earning above
subsistence level income is equivalent to a quality increase of the labor force
that may offset the loss in potential output due to taxes. We thus illustrate
how a more equal distribution of income via food subsidies may actually
increase free disposable income for all, even if savings are decreased in the
process. For some of the low-skilled this is due to an increase in the quality
of innate abilities, while the rest of the unskilled benefit from their increased
scarcity that leads to higher wages.
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2 The Model
2.1 The basic equations
At each point in time, three generations live in a closed economy. The young
are dependent on their parents for consumption, who also have to provide
for their own consumption and save for old age. The savings of the parent
generation determine the capital stock for the next period. Each of the three
phases in life is assumed to take one unit of time. Utility is defined in terms
of the parent generation:
U = cαa · c1−α−βo · cβy (1)
where cy is the consumption of their children, ca is the consumption of
the adults and co the consumption of the parents when old. Adults are
optimizing utility taking into account their budget constraints:
w = cy + ca + s (2)
co = s(1 + r) (3)
Setting up and solving a Lagrange function where w is the real wage rate, s
are savings and r is the real interest rate leads to
ca = wα (4)
cy = wβ (5)
co = w(1 + r)(1− α− β) (6)
s = w(1− α− β) (7)
The ability distribution in the population is modeled by distinguishing be-
tween two skill groups. The group of low-ability workers is uniformly dis-
tributed over a range of skills from 0 to l¯. Similarly, the high-ability workers
are uniformly distributed over a range starting at 0 and ending at h¯. There
are NL low-ability and NH high-ability workers in the total population N .
There is a spectrum of jobs that corresponds to the spectrum of skills
outlined above. These jobs are part of a nested Ethier production function,
which is organized as follows: at the upper level we assume a Cobb-Douglas
function describing how output Y is produced using a function between
capital K and effective labor services L.
Y = A ·K1−ζLζ (8)
Total effective labor services L consist of a CES aggregate of low-ability
labor LL and high-ability labor LH .
L = (LζL + L
ζ
H)
1
ζ (9)
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Low-ability labor and high-ability labor are in turn again a CES aggregate
of the different abilities belonging to the low- and high-ability ranges:
LL =
(∫ l¯
i=0
ci · lζi di
) 1
ζ
(10)
LH =
(∫ h¯
j=0
cj · lζjdj
) 1
ζ
(11)
In equations (10) and (11) we have defined the direct contribution of each
ability to its corresponding aggregate as:
cz,i = c0,z · eγz ·i 0 ≤ i ≤ z¯, z = l, h (12)
where c0, γz,i are constant positive numbers. Equation (12) has the effect of
a marginal productivity of labor that rises with its ability level. It should be
noted that for a positive value of γ, cz,i works as if it was skill-augmenting
technical change. In fact, cz,i does not change over time, but differs among
abilities. For the common employment levels by ability in each separate
ability range we find:
li =
NL
l¯
∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ l¯, hj = NH
h¯
∀ l¯ ≤ j ≤ h¯ (13)
where NL and NH refer respectively to the shares of low- and high-ability
workers in the population and are defined as follows:
NL = µL ·N (14)
NH = (1− µL) ·N (15)
where µL is the share of people with relatively low abilities in the population.
Wage rates are equal to the marginal product of each worker, thus the the
wage for a low-ability worker with ability i is given by:
wL,i = A · cL,0 · eiγL ·K1−ζ · ζ
(
NµL
l¯
)−1+ζ
(16)
For a high-ability worker we find by analogy:
wH,j = A · cH,0 · ejγH ·K1−ζ · ζ
(
N(1− µL)
h¯
)−1+ζ
(17)
2.2 Subsistence income and subsistence skills
We assume now that there is a real income level w¯ such that an income
below that level is not sufficient to provide the necessities of food and shel-
ter to the children. Following the evidence presented in the introductory
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paragraphs, we assume that for people earning less than w¯ this results in
a higher probability that their offspring will have innate abilities that are
in the low-ability range. This implies that the ability distribution for the
adults of the next generation depends on the income distribution of the
current adult generation.
It follows immediately from equations (12), (16) and (17) that there
exists a subsistence ability level that earns the subsistence wage w¯. This
ability level can be obtained by finding i for which
w¯ = wz,i = A · cL,0 · eiγL ·K1−ζ · ζ
(
NµL
l¯
)−1+ζ
∀0 ≤ i ≤ l¯ (18)
The corresponding value of i could be bigger than l¯. In that case all low-
ability workers would earn wages below the subsistence level. If i is in the
low-ability range, then part of the low-ability population will earn an above
subsistence level wage. The subsistence ability level for the high-ability
group can be obtained in exactly the same way.
w¯ = wz,j = A · cH,0 · ejγH ·K1−ζ · ζ
(
N(1− µL)
h¯
)−1+ζ
∀0 ≤ i ≤ h¯ (19)
If the corresponding ability level is below 0, then the entire high-ability sub-
population earns above subsistence wages. If it is above h¯, then the entire
high-ability population has a wage below the subsistence level. We will refer
to the respective subsistence ability levels as i(w¯) and j(w¯).2 Consequently,
the fraction of low-ability workers (which has to remain between 0 and 1)
earning below subsistence wages can be expressed by
Fw¯,L = max
[
0,min
[
1,
i(w¯)
l¯
]]
(20)
and accordingly for high-ability workers.
Fw¯,H = max
[
0,min
[
1,
j(w¯)
h¯
]]
(21)
2.3 The propagation of innate abilities
Figure 1 depicts how the distribution of abilities within the population
changes between generations. Going from left to right in the Figure mimics
the succession of generations in time. We assume that each generation is
exactly the same size. Generation t is divided into two main groups: those
with relatively low abilities which are labeled L, and those with relatively
high abilities labeled H. The adults in each ability group are subdivided into
two classes: those who earn below subsistence wages, indicated by a minus
2i(w¯) and j(w¯) can be found by solving (18) and (19) for i and j respectively.
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Generation t Generation t+1 
L 
H 
H+ 
H- 
L+ 
L- 
L 
H 
H+ 
H- 
L+ 
L- 
+pi  −pi  +− pi1  −− pi1  
Figure 1: The intergenerational propagation of abilities
sign, and those earning above subsistence wages, indicated by a plus sign.
The classes earning below subsistence wages will have offspring that has
a relatively high probability of being in the next generation of low-ability
adults. This probability is labeled Π− . The classes earning above subsis-
tence wages still have a probability Π+ < Π− of having offspring that will
end up as low-ability adults in the next generation. These probabilities can
also be interpreted as the relative contributions of each class in generation i
to the main ability groups in the next generation. Π+ x 100 percent of the
adults in the class of low-ability above subsistence wage earners in genera-
tion t, i.e. L+, will have offspring that will belong to the next generation’s
low-ability group of adults, whereas (1- Π+) x 100 percent of the adults in
L+ will have offspring that will belong to the next generation’s high-ability
adults. It should be noted that the sizes of the various sub-classes depend on
the wage rates earned by the low-ability and high-ability workers. It should
also be noted that once the class of low-ability workers is large enough, wages
will be depressed to such an extent that the class L- grows at the expense of
L+, thus giving rise to an even larger group L in the next generation (since
Π+ < Π−, by assumption). This depresses wages for the low-ability adults
in the next generation even more. However, the fact that we have assumed
that the probability of the offspring of low-ability adults ending up in the
high-ability group in the next generation is strictly larger than zero (but
relatively small), ensures that the next generation will always contain some
high-ability workers.
This implies that the size of the next generation of high-skilled workers
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will be given by:
NL,t+1 = (1−Π−) · (Fw¯,L ·NL,t + Fw¯,H ·NH,t)
+ (1−Π+) · ((1− Fw¯,L) ·NL,t + (1− Fw¯,H) ·NH,t) (22)
where the subscript t refers to a particular generation rather than ordinary
time. For the number of low-ability workers in the next generation we find
by analogy:
NH,t+1 = Π− · (Fw¯,L ·NL,t + Fw¯,H ·NH,t)
+ Π+ · ((1− Fw¯,L) ·NL,t + (1− Fw¯,H) ·NH,t) (23)
Given the values of the structural parameters of the model3, we can depict
the possible equilibria with respect to the skill distribution in Figure 1.
Three possible equilibria arise, as given by the points of intersection of the
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
µLHtL
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
µLHt+1L
 
Figure 2: Equilibrium distribution of low-ability workers
’discontinuous’ ability propagation curve (APC) and the 45o line. Two of
these equilibria are stable, and while the low-ability equilibrium, i.e. the
one with the highest share of µL will always exist, the other two depend on
the parameters chosen.
2.4 The share of low-ability workers and subsistence wages
Due to the Ethier production function including the ”love of variety” argu-
ment with respect to the diversity of abilities, below subsistence wages may
arise in the high-ability range without implying that all low-ability workers
have to earn below subsistence wages, too. Figure (3)4 shows the shares of
3The same parameter values as in the sensitivity analysis (section 3) were used, but
the Π values adapted to induce the emergence of all three possible equilibria.
4See section 3 for the parameter values used.
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Figure 3: Development of subsistence wage earners for different ability dis-
tributions
low- and high-ability workers who earn either above or below subsistence
wages. Specifically, for very low values of µL, no low-ability workers earn
below subsistence wages (the low-ability workers L− earning below subsis-
tence wages are depicted by the black dashed line), while some workers
in the high-ability range do (H−, gray dashed line). This is due to the
scarcity of low-ability workers that drives wages up and above the subsis-
tence wage level. By contrast, high-ability workers are not scarce at all and
some do thus earn below subsistence wages. Nevertheless, a larger share of
high-ability workers still earns above subsistence wages (H+, black dotted
line). When moving towards a higher share of low-ability workers, some
low-ability workers start to earn wages below the subsistence level as well,
signalled by the rising black dashed line. The black solid line, depicting
the share of low-ability workers earning above subsistence wages, starts to
decrease at the same instance, until it reaches zero at around 0.65 in this
case. Thus, all low-ability workers from there on will earn below subsistence
wages. Since high-ability labor becomes increasingly scarce, the share of
high-ability workers earning below subsistence level drops, until it reaches
zero at around µL=0.35 in this example. These results suggest that output
may not be optimal at the stable low-ability equilibrium found in the last
section, since the lowest total share of below subsistence earning workers
is found at a much lower level of low-ability individuals (in this numerical
example, at around 0.3). The following section will therefor determine the
utility maximizing distribution of abilities in the population.
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2.5 The efficiency maximizing distribution of abilities
In order to judge which one of the equilibria is preferable in terms of pro-
duced output and, consequently, wages and utility, and whether one of them
coincides with the actual optimal distribution of innate skills in the econ-
omy, it is necessary to calculate the effective labor supply EL and its average
(AEL).
EL = (H + L)
1
ζ ⇒ AEL = (H + L)
1
ζ
N
(24)
Evaluating AEL using equations (9),(10) and (11) gives
AEL =
(
cH,0(eh¯γH + 1)h¯−ζ(1− µL)ζ
γH
+
cL,0(el¯γL + 1)l¯−ζµLζ
γL
) 1
ζ
(25)
Using the same parameters as before, the path of average labor efficiency
(AEL) and thus income per head for given K is shown in function of the share
of low-ability workers. It is obvious that µL∗, the efficiency maximizing share
of low-ability workers, does coincide with either one of the stable equilibria
only by chance,5which leaves room for policy. Redistributive policy will
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
µLHtL
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Figure 4: Income per head in relation to the ability distribution
make the equilibrium move to the left, which would imply higher total output
if the output per head curve remained unchanged. In terms of Figure (5)
further below, this would imply a move from C to D. However, the output
curve will shift downwards since the wages of workers will be taxed, which
will decrease total savings, and total real savings are equal to the capital
stock by assumption.6 If however the loss in income due to lower savings is
smaller than the increase in income due to a more equal ability distribution,
5This result was generated using different sets of parameters.
6We disregard the depreciation of capital.
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redistributive policy is welfare efficient. In terms of Figure (5), this is the
case if the point F lies above point E, as it is actually depicted. The following
section however first discusses the working of the model in order to find out
how changes in the different variables and different tax rates actually affect
the model, before moving on to an actual policy experiment in section 4.
 
F   E 
NY /∆  
Y/N 
D 
C 
B 
A 
Lµ  
Figure 5: The potential for welfare improvement due to redistributive policy
3 Sensitivity analysis
Because a closed form solution for the model cannot readily be obtained, we
illustrate the working of the model in two ways. In this section we first show
how the main relations of the model are affected by changes in the various
model parameters. There are two main relations in the model:
1. The relation between the ability distribution within the current gen-
eration of adults and that within the next generation of adults;
2. and the relation between output per head and the ability distribution
within the current generation of adults.
In the next section, we then continue to illustrate the working of the model
by implementing an income redistribution policy by means of the taxation
of the wage income of adults and then recycling the tax proceeds in the form
of consumption coupons for those who cannot offer their offspring at least
subsistence level consumption from their after-tax income.
Because of the discontinuities present in the model, we use some nu-
merical simulations to show how the model works. In order to obtain these
numerical outcomes, we have used the following parameter values, next to
the assumption that the entire population is scaled to one at all times.
3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 13
Table 1: Model parameter values
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
c¯y 0.667 h¯ 1.000 γH 1.000
α 0.333 A 2.000 cl0 1.000
β 0.333 ζ 0.900 ch0 1.105
l¯ 1.000 γL 0.100 w¯ 2.000
In addition, Π+, i.e. the probability that a well-nourished child will find
itself in the low ability range is set equal to 0.05, and Π−, i.e. the probability
that a malnourished child will be in the low ability range is set equal to 0.7.
The parameters for which we have performed the sensitivity analysis are l¯,
h¯, γL, γH , cl0, ch0, w¯, because we know only little about their impact on the
intergenerational propagation of abilities a priori. However, all parameters,
except the subsistence wage, influence the productivity of the corresponding
ability classes directly and positively. In Figure 6 , where the dashed lines
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
µLHtL
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Figure 6: (a)effect of a change in l¯ (b) effect of a change in h¯
correspond with the new parameter values and the dotted line is a 45o - line
as usual, we have increased the ranges for the low-ability and high-ability
classes by 10 percent respectively. This has the effect of increasing the aver-
age productivity of each class, since each class will be uniformly spread over
a larger range, thus raising the average contribution of the classes as a whole
to the labor complex. Looking at Figure 6, we find that an increase in l¯ by 10
percent shifts the ’ability propagation curve’ (or APC for short) downwards,
especially for medium levels of the current share of low-ability workers in the
population, i.e. µl. This downward shift is caused by the rise in low-ability
wages that decreases the number of people earning below subsistence wages,
and hence reduces the next generation of low-ability adults, ceteris paribus.
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For low values of µl, hence high values of the share of high-ability adults
in the current population, a rise in the wage rate of low-ability workers has
little effect on the APC, since there are so few low-ability adults that they
earned above subsistence wages anyway. That is precisely the reason why
we only see an effect of a rise in h¯ for low values of µl, hence high values
of the share of high-ability workers and therefor relatively low (even below
subsistence) wages for these workers. For the changes in the parameters
γL and γH we can observe qualitatively the same results as in Figure 6, so
these results are not reported in detail here. The results for cl0 and ch0 are
distinctly different, though, as can be seen from Figure 7. The effects of a
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Figure 7: (a)The effect of a change in cl0 (b)The effect of a change in ch0
10 percent change in the distribution parameters are much larger than those
of the change in the ability range. We see that the APC changes dramati-
cally in the case of the low-ability workers, since with that change nearly all
workers will start earning above subsistence wages, allowing the economy to
move towards a high-ability composition of the population, thus enabling
the economy to reap the positive productivity effects of such a move. It
should be noted that even with a relatively large share of high-ability work-
ers in the population, wages are generally above subsistence levels. Hence,
the rise in the high-ability contribution coefficients does change the shape
of the APC but only very little at the spot where it could actually make a
difference for the ability composition of the population. Finally, we see that
a fall in the subsistence wage by 10 percent (through a subsidy for instance),
has very similar effects as a 10 percent rise in cl0 , as shown in Figure 8. The
only difference here is the horizontal part of the APC near the vertical axis,
that is due to the fact that all workers, with both low and high abilities, now
will earn enough to make sure their offspring has the best chances of ending
up in the high-ability range. Still, 30 percent will end up in the low-ability
range, since that is the minimum value that the share of low-ability workers
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in the population can attain.7
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Figure 8: The effect of a drop in the subsistence wage rate
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Figure 9: (a)The effect of a change in l¯ (b)The effect of a change in l¯
In Figure 9 we show how average product per head (further called APH)
changes as the parameters are changed. Not surprisingly, the average prod-
uct curve shifts upwards as indicated by the dashed line, and more so for
high values of the share of low-ability workers in the population in Figure
9, part(a). Obviously the impact of an average productivity increase of low-
ability workers is largest if there are many of those workers around. Mutatis
mutandis this holds true for Figure 9,part(b) as well. In Figure 10 we show
what happens if the distribution coefficients change, since, as before, the
7This follows immediately from Figure (1) and the values of Π+, since in the case of
wages being all above subsistence levels L− = H− = 0 and we therefore find L
N
= Π+,
where N measures the size of the population, i.e. in this case N = L+ +H+.
3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 16
changes in the APH-curve due to changes in γL and γH are qualitatively
very similar to those in Figure 9.
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Figure 10: Effect of a change in the (a)low ability and (b)high ability distri-
bution coefficient
In Figure 10 we see that a change in the distribution coefficients has fairly
large and positive effects. The relative impact is largest for high values of
µL in case of the low-ability distribution coefficients and for low values of µL
in case of the high-ability distribution coefficients, for the reasons outlined
above.
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Figure 11: (a)Effect of a change in the subsistence wage (b) Effect of taxes
Finally, Figure 11, part (a) shows that nothing happens to the average
product curve if we lower the subsistence wage by 10 percent. This is because
we have assumed that only the younger generation is hit by malnutrition,
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and we did not specify any link between labor productivity at the individual
level and having to lead a below subsistence life as such. We have done this
for reasons of simplicity. Nonetheless, this implies that the positive general
equilibrium productivity effects at the macro level will have a tendency to
be underestimated. This Figure also suggests that it would be relatively
simple to devise a policy that allows us to change the ability distribution
of the population through income redistribution measures, since changing
the subsistence wage itself does not change the APH-curve. However, if,
as we plan to do, we finance the change in subsistence wages through wage
taxes, this will negatively influence savings (cf. equation (7)) and hence the
size of the capital stock for the next generation. This in turn will lead to
a downward shift of the APH-curve, as shown in Figure 1, but that is also
shown for this particular parameterization in Figure 11, part (b).
In the next section we will now describe how we have implemented an
income redistribution policy that generates such a change in the ability
distribution of the population that a welfare improvement for society as a
whole can be realized even if savings do fall.
4 A Policy Experiment
4.1 Description of the policy experiment
The income redistribution experiment has the purpose of increasing the
share of high-ability workers in the population, under the following con-
straints and principles:
1. The first generation of adults implementing the policy should not suf-
fer from the policy. It will have to pay the taxes, but it should be
compensated by the second generation when it is their turn to be
productive;
2. The old in the first generation should not be taxed, since they cannot
be compensated by the second generation as they will be no longer
alive when the second generation becomes productive;
3. The second generation should compensate the first through a transfer
of income to the old while generating a positive change in utility which
exactly matches the negative change in utility experienced by the old
when they were the adults of the previous generation. We will show
that the upward movement along the APF-curve is in this case so large
that the second generation of adults may also gain as compared to the
no-policy situation;
4. The third generation and all subsequent generations will need to main-
tain the new ability distribution of the population as it resulted from
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the policies executed by the first and the second generation. As we
will show, there is no room to completely compensate the second gen-
eration of adults, since that entails ever-increasing wage taxes and
ultimately the collapse of the economy;
5. The only ’rights’ that the young have at any time is to be able to
consume (at least) at subsistence level. A high income of their parents
does not entitle them to a high income of their own, or compensation
by somebody else if their income falls short of the income of their
parents.
Under these principles we will show that the model we have specified
enables a welfare improvement measured by total utility experienced by
all generations, the source of which is the productivity improvement at the
aggregate level that can be realized through a better match between abilities
available in the population and the production technologies available to that
population.
4.2 Policy Implementation
We implement the redistribution policy by levying a proportional wage tax
on all wages, including those of below subsistence earners. Then the tax
revenue is used to finance consumption coupons that are used to fill the gap
between consumption of the young out of disposable (after-tax) wage income
of their parents (cf. equation (5) where the wage rate should be replaced
by disposable wages (1 − τ) ∗ w , and where τ represents the proportional
tax rate) and the subsistence level consumption. For the group of low- and
high-ability workers we therefor have:
CA,i = max(0, c¯− β(1− τ)wA,i) forA = L,H (26)
where CA,i is the volume of consumption by the offspring of class i in ability
group A financed using the consumption coupons. For reason of simplicity
we assume that one coupon corresponds to one unit of consumption, hence
CA,i is also the number of coupons to which class i of ability group A is
entitled. Since the wage rate rises for increasing i, it follows that we can
calculate the marginal class for which the after-tax wage is enough to finance
the subsistence level consumption of their young without any coupons from
the requirement CA,i = 0. Equation 26 can also be used for the first gen-
eration to calculate the marginal subsistence class by setting τ = 0 , and
then finding the i that makes CA,i = 0 by substituting equation (16) or (17)
for the low- and high-ability groups respectively. It turns out that for the
parameters we have chosen, all low-ability workers earn below subsistence
wages, and all high-ability workers earn above subsistence wages. Hence the
generation of high-ability adults will surely lose from the implementation of
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the redistribution policy, and will therefor have to be compensated by the
next generation of adults. But even though the low-ability adults all earn
below subsistence level wages, it is well possible that the introduction of a
proportional wage tax will make the relatively high-wage earners less well
off than they would be in the no-tax situation. These workers would also
need to be compensated when old. We will come back to this compensa-
tion issue in more detail below, but first we will outline how the tax rate
necessary to cover all coupon expenses is calculated given the structure of
the model outlined above. The total costs of consumption coupons to be
covered by taxes can be obtained by straightforward integration of (26) over
all sub-classes of low- and high-ability workers. We get:
TC =
∫ i¯
0
(c¯y − β(1− τ)wL,i)lidi+
∫ j¯
0
(c¯y − β(1− τ)wH,j)hjdj (27)
where i¯ and j¯ are the marginal disposable subsistence wage earning classes
in the low-ability and high-ability groups of adults respectively. Moreover,
li and hj are the number of individuals in these low- and high-ability sub-
classes respectively (cf. equation (13)) . At the same time, for a given tax
rate τ , total tax income would be given by:
TT =
∫ l¯
0
τ · wL,i · li · di+
∫ h¯
0
τ · wH,j · hj · dj (28)
and the tax rate that is necessary to cover the total cost of all coupons out of
tax revenue can then be obtained by equating (27) and (28). An impression
of the shape of the graphs behind (27) and (28) as a function of the share
of low-ability adults in the population is provided in Figure 12.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
µL
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
TC,TT Taxincome and Couponcost
 
Figure 12: Total tax revenue and total coupon cost for different tax rates
The U-shaped curves in Figure 12 are the total coupon costs for a
given ability distribution in the current population and for a given tax rate
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(that influences disposable wage income hence the need for coupons, ceteris
paribus). The lower of the two curves is associated with a tax rate equal
to 0.01, and the higher of the two with a tax rate equal to 0.02. The two
curves that have a concave shape are the corresponding tax revenue curves.
They have an inverted u-shape, because of the shape of the APH-curve that
shows a maximum where the coupon costs show a minimum, and also tax
revenue shows a maximum since tax revenue should be roughly proportional
to average income per head. We can conclude two things. First of all, if the
tax rate goes up, a larger proportion of low-ability workers can be supplied
with coupons. At this point, one should recall that the parameters we have
chosen lead to a point of intersection of the APC with the 45o line at a
value of µL = 0.857 . This means that in this low-ability equilibrium only
about 14 percent of all people are in the high-ability range. The minimum
low-ability composition of the population is equal to µL = 0.3 (cf. footnote
8). This means that we should try to find a point of intersection between
the TT and TC curves for a value of µL = 0.857 . Since the point of inter-
section between both curves moves to the right if the tax rate increases, we
can conclude that the tax rate that can finance all the coupons necessary
to get from µL = 0.857 to µL = 0.300 must be higher than 0.02. In fact,
numerical solution of TT=TC results in a tax rate equal to 0.0345. This
tax rate will ensure that the next generation of adults will consist of a 30-70
percent mix of low- and high-ability workers respectively. Even at this tax
rate, high-ability workers continue to earn a disposable wage that allows
above subsistence level consumption for their offspring. However, the next
generation of high-ability workers may not be so lucky, since there are many
more of them. At the same time we would expect that since the number
of low-ability workers has decreased dramatically in the next generation,
at least some of them might now earn above subsistence level wages. We
can check this by evaluating the marginal subsistence level wage classes in
the groups of high- and low-ability workers in the next generation at the
new 30-70 percent ability distribution of the second generation. It turns
out that this change in the ability composition of the population does in-
deed make some of the high-ability workers earn below subsistence wages.
At a zero tax rate the fraction of high-ability workers earning such a wage
is 0.0628, whereas the corresponding fraction of low-ability workers earn-
ing below subsistence wages is now 0.2155, having dropped considerably.
Indeed, in the old equilibrium, all low-ability workers earned below subsis-
tence wages, amounting to about 86% of the population, while in the new
equilibrium only about 11%8 of the people earn below subsistence wages. In
addition to this, average income per head has risen, which ensures that the
coupon burden for the current generation should be much less than it has
been for the previous generation of adults. Indeed, it is even the case that
80.0628 · 70 + 0.2115 · 30 = 10.741
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the adults from the previous generation that have suffered utility losses can
be completely compensated for their losses by transferring tax revenue to
them now that they are old. This is the subject of the next section.
4.3 Compensation of the parent generation
All high-ability adults of the first generation are ’losers’, and perhaps also
part of the low-ability workers. The marginal ’loser’ is characterized by
the fact that his utility in the situation with coupons would be exactly the
same as his utility would be in the situation without coupons (and without
taxes!). From equations (1)-(5), we can rewrite utility for an individual in
ability group A and class i earning a disposable wage (1− τ) · wA,i for the
case where he would obtain coupons (indicated by uc) and the normal case
(indicated by u) as a function of the wage rate as follows:
uA,i = αα · ββ · (1− α− β)1−α−βwA,i (29)
ucA,i = αα · (c¯yβ) · (1− α− β)1−α−β
(
(1− τ)wcA,i
)1−β
(30)
We can solve (29) and (30) for the marginal loser by equating them and
noting that wA,i depends positively on i. Moreover (29) and (30) should be
evaluated for µ = 0.857 , since we want to identify the losers in the first
generation adults. Before doing that, however, it should be noted that the
wA,i’s themselves will be different in the two different situations because
of the impact of the tax on wages, hence the addition of a superscript c
to denote the situation with coupons. So wcA,i and wA,i actually represent
different values in both equations. However, given the parameterization
we have chosen, we can numerically determine the marginal losers for both
ability groups of the adults of generation 1. It turns out that the marginal
loser in the low-ability group is in class 0.749, i.e. about 25 percent of the
low-ability workers will actually lose some utility when adults. The marginal
loser in the high-ability group is in class 0 as expected, since all high-ability
workers earned above subsistence wages in the no-tax situation. However,
adding gains and losses together for all losers and winners using equations
(29) and (30) we find that there is a net utility gain from the redistribution
of income alone equal to 1.99%, that is before the positive productivity
effects of the shift in the ability distribution within the population are even
realized. Nonetheless, the losers will have to be compensated by an increase
in their consumption in the next period when they are old in such a way
that their compensated utility matches exactly the level of utility they would
have had without the tax. One should realize that the marginal losers do
not get any coupons, hence the requirements that compensated utility and
no-tax utility should be the same results in the following equation for the
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compensated consumption level of the old in the second generation:
un
u0
=
(
cna
c0a
)α(cny
c0y
)β (
cn0
c00
)1−α−β
= 1 ⇔
cny
c0y
=
(cna
c0a
)α(cny
c0y
)β
−1
1−α−β
(31)
where the superscripts n and o refer to the new situation (with the tax) and
the old situation (without the tax), and where we have dropped all other
superscripts. Equation (31) describes how much the new level of consump-
tion of the old should be relative to the no-tax situation if they are to be
compensated completely for their losses while being adults in the previous
generation. Without compensation, the level of consumption of the losers
when old would have been given by c0 = (1−τ) ·wn ·(1−α−β) , and provid-
ing an increase of this level of z percent, would then enable us to calculate
the required level of z from (31) and the definitions of old and new levels of
consumption in function of old and new wages and tax rates, since we imme-
diately find when substituting ((4)-(6) and cn0 = (1+z)·(1−τ)·wn ·(1−α−β)
into (31):
1 + z =
(
wn(1− τ)
w0
) −1
1−α−β
=
(
uT
u0
) −1
1−α−β
(32)
where uT refers to utility for first generation adults in the situation with a
tax and without compensation. Given the value of z that can be obtained for
all the losers in the first generation belonging to the relevant sub-classes of
the low-ability and high-ability adults, we can calculate similarly as before
by aggregating over all losers how much compensation is needed for a given
tax rate. This compensation then has to be added to the cost of the coupons
needed to guarantee subsistence level consumption for the young generation
associated with the 21% below subsistence wage earning low-ability workers
and the 6% below subsistence wage earning high-ability workers. The tax
rate necessary to cover the coupon cost in this case is only 0.000277, firstly
since there are far less coupons to finance in the first place, and secondly be-
cause income per head has risen. The tax rate including the compensation of
the losses of the first generation of adults is only 0.000434. Because this tax
rate is slightly higher than the tax rate needed to finance the coupons, the
number of below subsistence wage earners will rise slightly, too. This then
means that passing this slightly higher tax burden to the next generation
by a similar compensation as for the first generation, and so on, will lead to
still higher demand for coupons, tax burdens, compensations, coupons etc.
This implies that somebody will have to foot the bill, and we have chosen
for the second generation to do that, the more so because as a whole the
second generation is a net winner already. In principle, however, one could
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no doubt calculate a more equitable distribution of gains and losses between
the second and the third generation, but that is not the purpose of this paper
as such. We only wanted to show that a welfare improvement is possible,
and that turns out to be the case, because the first generation gains 1.99
% in utility even before compensation: the low-ability workers gain 5.59 %
units whereas the high-ability workers lose 3.54 %, but there are many more
low-ability workers in the beginning than there are high-ability workers. To-
tal utility of the entire population amounted to 0.706 units before the tax,
and 0.720 units after the tax (without compensation yet) for the first gener-
ation of adults. When including the compensation scheme, total utility for
the second generation of adults amounts to 0.763 units which exceeds total
utility after the redistribution of income for the first generation by about 6
percent. For generations t+2 and later, utility will be even higher, since by
assumption they do not have to take over the tax burden from generation
t+1. Since the first generation t is completely compensated by generation
t+1, while generation t+1 experiences higher utility than generation t even
after compensating generation t for its initial loss in utility, whereas gen-
erations t+2 and later experience even higher utility than generation t+1
because of a lower tax burden, we conclude that this consumption coupon
scheme leads to a long-term improvement of utility for the population at no
real costs at all.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that malnutrition due to low innate abilities
and resulting low wages can lead to a low-ability, low-income equilibrium
in which low abilities are passed on from parents to children via insufficient
food intake. Redistributing income from ”rich” individuals to ”poor”, as well
as from the parent to the young generation, will lead to an increase in the
quality of labor such that the policy can be welfare improving if the initial
tax-paying generation is reimbursed for their utility loss during old age. Due
to the static nature of the model, i.e. no technological progress, schooling or
other sources of economic growth that could lift all wages above subsistence
level, tax policy will have to persist in all future periods in order to ensure
that the economy does not slip back into the poverty trap it emerged from.
It is worth noting that the increase in utility is possible although the
tax policy will decrease savings. This increase in utility is due to the fact
that investment in a higher share of people with relatively high abilities
in the population may provide a higher rate of return than investment in
physical capital. Obviously, this model served the purpose of highlighting
the existence of a situation like this. The non-algebraic nature of the ability
propagation curve in particular makes it impossible to analytically derive
the parameter ranges for which this situation does occur. Therefor it is not
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possible to assess at this stage whether or not the parameters we have chosen
come from a range of values that is ’reasonable’ a priori. An extension of
the model to find such ranges in a numerical way thus seems to be called for.
Given the role of savings in our model, a further interesting extension would
be to introduce economic growth into the model, in order to investigate in
how far capital-driven growth and the proposed redistributive policy are
compatible.
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